1 BEFORE THE SHORELINES HEARINGS BOARD 2 STATE OF WASHINGTON 3 IN THE MATTER OF A SUBSTANTIAL DEVELOPMENT PERMIT 4 ISSUED BY ISLAND COUNTY TO ALBERT P. MACDONALD, 5 ALBERT P. MACDONALD and 6 DENISE A. MACDONALD, 7 Appellants, 8 v. 9 ISLAND COUNTY, 10 Respondent. 11

SHB No. 80-29

FINAL FINDINGS OF FACT CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER

This matter, the Request for Review of a shoreline substantial development permit issued by Island County, came before the Shorelines Hearings Board, Nat Washington, chairman, A. M. O'Meara, Jack Shero, Rodney Kerslake, and David Akana (presiding), at a hearing in Seattle on October 10, 1980.

Appellants appeared and were represented by their attorney, R. Patrick McGreevy; respondent was represented by Alan R. Hancock,

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deputy prosecuting attorney.

The initial question submitted to the Board for decision is whether appellants applied for the shoreline substantial development permit in question. In the course of the hearing, evidence unrelated to that precise issue but relevant to other issues was submitted by both parties, and upon which certain findings and conclusions are based.

Having heard the testimony, having examined the exhibits, and having considered the contentions of the parties, the Board makes these FINDINGS OF FACT

I

In July of 1976 appellants purchased two waterfront lots (Nos. 7 and 8) in the plat of First Addition to Wilkes Gary Heights on Camana Island in Island County. The lots abut Saratoga Passage. While sharing a generally southwesterly view of the water, the waterward boundary of the two lots come to a point and are about 12 degrees from lying in a straight line. Appellants have some ownership interest to the tidelands in front of the lots. Lot 7 has 116 waterfront feet; lot 8 has 100 waterfront feet. Both lots, though irregular in shape, extend upland as much as 167 feet.

ΊI

As a condition of sale, appellants received the first page of a document entitled "Exemption from Shoreline Management Act Substantial Development Requirement." The document exempted the "construction of protective bulkheading common to a single-family residence," upon lots 7 and 8. A site plan and vicinity map were included as a necessary

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part of the exemption request which pages were not received by appellant at the closing of the sale in 1976. The site plan depicts a proposed bulkhead lying in a straight line and connecting to existing bulkheads on lots 6 and 9. The exemption request was submitted in appellants' name by a contractor named Watkins. Appellants deny that Watkins had authority to submit the request for them.

III

In 1976, appellants contracted with Watkins to install two septic systems, a road and bulkhead for \$5000. Except for the septic system, the contract was not completed by Watkins, however. Appellants intended the two-lot development for their retirement home and for keeping their options open.

ΙV

On April 4, 1979, appellants contacted the Island County Planning Department seeking "instructions" to put the bulkhead in. After reviewing the file, the planner orally granted appellants an "extension" of the 1976 exemption for the bulkhead. Appellants were also told that a building permit would be needed. A written extension, for a period of one year dated April 6, 1979, was sent to appellants. Appellants were instructed that "the proposed bulkhead is to be constructed in line with the existing bulkheads on the adjoining properties."

V

The bulkhead was started in October of 1979 by a different contractor and completed at a cost of about \$7500. The project

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Included placing fill behind the bulkhead and grading the two lots. The bulkhead, as constructed, extends waterward beyond the "ordinary high water mark" as that term is known and defined in RCW 90.58.030(2)(b). The bulkhead does not conform to the site plan as submitted in 1976 by Watkins. As constructed, the bulkhead extends to a point on the tidelands about 30 feet beyond a line drawn between adjacent, existing bulkheads.

An access road from a country road to the two lots was also started by appellants within 200 feet of the shoreline. The construction of the road involved removal of vegetation, trees, and a portion of an upland bank, and placing the fill elsewhere on the site. If there was an existing road to the two lots prior to the construction of the present road, it was not easily tranversed, even by foot over the uneven terrain and through the vegetation and trees.

VI

On October 19, 1979, respondent's planning department sent appellants a shoreline substantial development permit application along with a memorandum requesting that no further roadwork or grading take place. On October 31, 1979, appellants returned the environmental checklist along with a letter stating that the property was purchased to provide them with a retirement home. An exemption from the Shoreline Management Act (SMA) was claimed and requested for all the existing and proposed developments.

VIT

On November 15, 1979, respondent issued a stop work order directed

FINAL FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW & ORDER to the construction on lots 7 and 8 because the road, bulkhead, and grading was contended to be in violation of the SMA. After the notice was issued, drainlines at the toe of the slope and some reseeding was done to prevent erosion.

VIII

On February 6, 1980, appellants submitted an application for a substantial development permit without the signature page. A letter explained that appellant completed the application for the purpose of determing whether this is a "substantial development." The proposed development as set forth in item nine of the application was a "single-family residence, two story." The described current improvements on the vacant lot included bulkhead, road, septic system, and water line. The unsigned application form was received by the County on February 8, 1980. On his own initiative, respondent's planner, by interlineation, expanded the description of the proposed development set forth in item nine to include grading the property and constructing a bulkhead, road and drainage. On February 8, the County requested the payment of the required \$25.00 application fee.

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On February 7, 1980, prior to receiving appellants unsigned application, respondent's planner informed appellants by letter that a shoreline substantial development permit was required for the grading,

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<sup>1.</sup> WAC 173-14-110 does not specifically require that a shoreline substantial development permit be signed.

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roadwork, and bulkheading which had already occurred on the two lots. The planner also requested appellant to submit an application for such a permit.

X

At a February 27, 1980 pre-hearing conference attended by appellants and representatives from the county, appellants again claimed an exemption for all the developments. The county representatives told appellant that the developments were not exempt and interpreted the claim as being an application under protest.

XΙ

As a result of the February 27 meeting appellants learned that they were requird to obtain, and did apply for, a permit to gain access to the county road right of way for lots 7 and 8. An access permit was later issued conditioned upon stabilizing an embankment which appellants had earlier cut away in constructing the access road.

XII

On March 21, 1980, the bulkhead and fill were inspected by a representative of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. The investigation disclosed a bulkhead of vertical logs placed side by side located 15 feet waterward of the line of mean higher high water. The bulkhead was built in two segments separated by a 12 foot gap in the center. Approximately 340 cubic yards of upland material was used as backfill.

By letter dated April 21, 1980, appellants were informed that the bulkhead and fill were considered to be in violation of various provisions of federal law.

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At the April 22, 1980 Planning Commission meeting, appellants' proposed developments were discussed. Appellants again claimed an exemption from the SMA for their activities. The Planning Commission noted the claim and considered the application. A permit was recommended for approval subject to five conditions:

- 1. That the bulkhead be constructed in line with existing bulkheads on adjoining properties but not extend beyond mean higher high water (11.1 feet) in between. The 11.1 foot mark will be staked by the County Planning Department.
- 2. That bank stabilization be provided adjacent to the County road as soon as possible in accordance with requirements of the County Engineering Department.
- That adequate drainage facilities to control surface water runoff be provided subject to the approval of the County Planning Department.
- 4. That all soil areas not to be used as roadways or building sites be revegetated before November, 1980, to control erosion.
- 5. That the subject lots be considered one lot for building purposes in accordance with Section 6.(2) of the Island County Zoning Ordinance.

### VIX

The matter came before the Island County Board of County

Commissioners on July 7, 1980. Appellants, through counsel, again
asserted an exemption from the SMA for their activities, underscored
that the permit application had not been signed and that appellants
did not formally apply for a permit. The matter was continued to July
21, at which meeting the Planning Commission recommendation was
accepted with an added condition relating to the starting and
completion dates for construction.

2.1)

Appellants did not intend to make application for a substantial development permit on February 6, 1980. However, appellants subsequent acts with respect to that February 6 document would lead a reasonable person in the planning department to believe that appellants did acquiesce in the treatment of the document as an application for a substantial development permit.

# IVX

On the application form submitted by appellants on February 6, the proposed development was described as a "single-family residence, two story" on lot 8. Appellants received a permit to undertake grading, roadwork, and bulkheading on lots 7 and 8. The developments allowed in the permit were not requested by appellant.

#### IIVX

Appellants intended that the grading, roadwork, and bulkheading conducted on the two lots stand or fall on their interpretation of the exemption provisions of the SMA. A reasonable person in appellants position would know or should have known that the county regarded the grading, roadwork and bulkheading as substantial development under the SMA no later than after the receipt of the letter dated February 7, 1980, and as early as after the receipt of the application forms in October of 1979.

## XVIII

Any Conclusion of Law which should be deemed a Finding of Fact is hereby adopted as such.

From these Findings the Board comes to the following

## CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Ι

Appellants' position with respect to the 1976 exemption is inconsistent. On one hand they seek to attain the benefits from the exemption which were secured on their behalf by an agent whose authority to do so they have since repudiated. On the other hand they refuse to recognize that the exemption documents included a drawing showing a proposed bulkhead in a straight line between adjacent existing bulkheads. The county's letter of April 6, 1979, does not contradict the alignment shown in drawing submitted.

We conclude that appellants ratified the act of Watkins when they chose to use the exemption secured by him on their behalf. If appellants did not remember seeing the drawing, the fault does not lie with the county which did rely on the drawings and representations made to it in the 1976 application.

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The 230 feet of bulkhead and 340 cubic yards of fill constructed on the shorelines and waterward of the ordinary high water mark creating land on two lots at a cost of \$7500 do not, in our view, fall within the exemptions of RCW 90.58.030(3)(e). Similarly, access to the lots along the path appellants have cleared does not appear to fall within normal maintenance or repair of existing developments recognized by RCW 90.58.030(3)(e). No significant access existed at the site until appellants decided to create it. Appellants' substantial developments on two lots each with a separate septic

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appellants intend to use one of the lots for their retirement house. 2

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system, are not exempt from the permit requirements simply because

Appellants insist that they have not applied for a permit and we conclude that they have not applied for the permit issued. Appellants clearly intend to assert exemptions to the SMA for their installed developments despite an opposing county position. The enforcement aspects under the SMA found in this case is better left to the superior court, as appellants suggest, rather than by devising an enforcement order characterized as a permit. Accordingly, the permit should be vacated as requested by appellants.

IV

Any Finding of Fact which should be deemed a Conclusion of Law is hereby adopted as such.

From these Conclusions the Board enters this

<sup>2.</sup> Department of Ecology v. Clallam County, SHB No. 159. See English Bay v. Island County, 89 Wn 2d 16 (1977). See generally, Department of Ecology v. Pacesetter Construction Co., 89 Wn 2d 203 (1977).

<sup>3.</sup> Even if there is no "substantial" development, "developments" must be consistent with the policy of the SMA and the master program. RCW 90.58.140(1).

# ORDER

The substantial development permit SDP No. 0580 issued to Albert and Denise MacDonald by Island County is vacated.

DONE at Lacey, Washington, this 24 day of October, 1980.

SHORELINES HEARINGS BOARD

NAT W. WASHINGTON, Chairman

DAVID AKANA, Member

JACK SHERO, Member

A. M. O'MEARA, Member

RODNEY KERSBAKE, Member

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